Spanish Abstract: Todo banco central debe tomar sus decisiones de política en medio de un escenario incierto, basándose en su conocimiento imperfecto y cambiante sobre la economía. Aunque la investigación sobre política monetaria con incertidumbre y aprendizaje ha encontrado pocos...

During the past three years, central banks have faced challenges that few foresaw during the period known as the Great Moderation. During the crisis, central banks have responded with traditional interest rate tools, been forced to deal with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and...

New Zealand was successful in switching from a moderate inflation regime to a low-inflation regime between 1986-92. This success is attributable both to a restrictive monetary policy, political support for the policy, and wide-ranging institutional reforms in the economy--including important...

The effects of forward looking expectations of future inflation on equilibrium inflation and interest rates are examined within an imperfect information framework. Expectations of future inflation affect equilibrium in a manner similar to an increase in the central bank's weight on future social...

This paper surveys the implications of uncertainty for the design of monetary policy. Among the topics discussed are the impact of imperfect or noisy information on the performance of simple rules, the performance of rules that are robust to the exogenous disturbance processes, the effects of...

In a standard New Keynesian model, a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal, timeless perspective, precommitment policy. By stabilizing output gap changes, the central bank...

Central banks often make announcements even though, in models in which dynamic time inconsistency of optimal policy plays a role, they have an incentive to lie. This paper studies the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing its target inflation rate...

Central banks often make announcements even though, in models in which dynamic time inconsistency of optimal policy plays a role, they have an incentive to lie. This paper studies the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing its target inflation rate...