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Product improvement and technological tying in a winner-take-all market

Gilbert, Richard J.; Riordan, Michael H. - 2003

In a winner-take-all duopoly market for systems in which firms invest to improvetheir products, a monopoly supplier of an essential system component may havean incentive to advantage itself by technological tying; that is, by designing thecomponent to work better in its own system. If the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009472335

Judicial cooperation in civil matters in the European Unoin : A guide for legal practitioners

Europäische Kommission / Generaldirektion Justiz - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011624885

Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships

Nocke, Volker; Rey, Patrick - 2014

between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441858

25 Years of European Merger Control

Affeldt, Pauline; Duso, Tomaso; Szücs, Florian - 2020

, barriers to entry, and foreclosure – were applied over time and across different dimensions such as the geographic market … foreclosure. These patterns are not changing over time. The role of the structural indicators in explaining competitive concerns …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012207978

Foreclosure externalities and vacant property registration ordinances

Biswas, Arnab; Cunningham, Christopher R.; Gerardi, … - 2019

externalities from foreclosures. VPROs were widely adopted by local governments across the United States during the foreclosure … enactment of VPROs in Florida more than halved the negative externality from foreclosure. This finding is robust to a rich set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389575

FHA loans in foreclosure proceedings: Distinguishing sources of interdependence in competing risks

Deng, Ran; Haghani, Shermineh - In: Journal of Risk and Financial Management 11 (2018) 1, pp. 1-15

A mortgage borrower has several options once a foreclosure proceedings is initiated, mainly default and prepayment … to default and time to prepayment once the foreclosure proceedings is initiated. More importantly, we examine the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012610991

Single monopoly profits, vertical mergers, and downstream entry deterrence

Hunold, Matthias; Schad, Jannika - 2021

We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it has sufficient market power anyways. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power and uses observable two-part tariffs. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012704828

Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership

Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa - 2022

input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013385143

25 years of European merger control

Affeldt, Pauline; Duso, Tomaso; Szücs, Florian - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 76 (2021), pp. 1-62

, barriers to entry, and foreclosure – were applied over time and across different geographic market definitions. On average … reform. Competitive concerns are also correlated with rising concentration, especially if entry barriers and foreclosure are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014000353

Upstream Competition with Complex and Unobservable Contracts

Atiyas, Izak; Doganoglu, Toker; Inceoglu, Firat - In: Review of Industrial Organization 58 (2020) 3, pp. 399-429

This paper examines situations where two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an input to an independent downstream competitor via privately observed contracts. We identify equilibria where competition in the upstream market emerges—the downstream competitor gets supplied—as well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503766