We model a banker's future bonuses as a series of call options on the bank's profits and show that bonus caps and … the model to US banking data and show that lengthening the standard one-year bonus payment interval has no material impact …

used for Macroprudential Regulationto encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail …

analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail …-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme … perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers …

analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail …-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme … perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers …

empirically. We model bonuses as a series of sequential call options on profits and show that they provide the higher risk …-taking incentives the shorter is the time between the payment points. However, using data on CEO bonuses at the end of 2006 and our … suggest that regulating leverage would be more effective than regulating bankers' compensation. …

compensation regulations and show that for a risk-neutral banker subject to positive switching costs of reducing bank risk, a bonus …

banks respond to the regulations by increasing the earnings sensitivity of bonuses. However, on a small number of banks with …

as banks respond to the regulations by increasing the earnings sensitivity of bonuses. However, on a small number of …

than US ones. Regarding the consequences of systemic risk, we show that dependence between the banking sector and a wide …