We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort decisions and allocative efficiency. We experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract) that differ in the structure of investor...

The growth literature is concerned with the convergence speed of economies providing valuable information on the speed at which out-of-steady state-economies move towards their long-run equilibria. Prominent examples of papers on that topic include Mankiw/Romer/Weil (1992) and...

We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort decisions and allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for entrepreneurial effort provision. Theoretically the...

We experimentally investigate if theoretically superior non-monotonic repayment contracts yield superior results in the laboratory. We find replacing standard debt contracts with repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contracts increases entrepreneurial income by 170% and total surplus by 30%.

In this paper we enrich the Brabander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) model of reciprocal entry by placing it i a setting of two-sided asymetric information. Following the limit pricing methodology of Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we show that the limit price is affected by a firm''s desire...

We study experimentally how players learn to make decisions if they face many different (normal-form) games. Games are generated randomly from a uniform distribution in each of 100 rounds. We find that agents do extrapolate between games but learn to play strategically equivalent games in the...