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This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be...
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This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369335
Many game-theoretic analyses of deterrence confirm the commonsense view that what determines whether a defender can effectively deter a challenger from an unwanted action is (1) the challenger’s perception of the level of punishment that the defender will be able to impose on the challenger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014617988
This report uses a generic two-stage escalation model to ask whether and when limited conflicts can occur. There are two players in the model: Challenger and Defender. Challenger can either initiate a conflict or not. If Challenger initiates, Defender can concede, respond-in-kind, or escalate....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010770045
A generic asymmetric two-stage escalation model of incomplete information is used to examine strategic relationships in which one player adopts a defense posture akin to the “Massive Retaliation†policy of the Eisenhower administration that relies only on the threat of escalation to...
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