We present twelve propositions constituting a contribution to a contingency view of time in organizations and synthesize apparently opposite perspectives of time. To articulate them, we relate the planning, action and improvisation strategic orientations to the dependent, independent and...

This study uses structural equation modeling to test a model of the impact of human resource management bundles on perceived organizational performance and innovation performance, on a large sample of companies. Strategic management orientation and innovation as a strategic factor are proposed...

We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is bene¯cial to the other. The game is in¯nitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is...

We present a simple proof of existence of subgame perfect equilibria in games with perfect information.

We present two simple proofs of existence of subgame perfect equi- libria in continuous games with perfect information.

This paper studies the credibility of the currency peg of Cape Verde (CV) by assessing the impact of economic fundamentals, our explanatory variables, on the stochastic properties of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP), the dependent variable, using EGARCH-M models. Our EMP descriptive analysis finds...

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable...

We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number M such that all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the discounted repeated prisoners dilemma can be obtained by subgame perfect equilibrium strategies with the following property: current play depends only on the number of the...

We discuss why surprises, defined as events that happen unexpectedly or expected events that take unexpected shapes, are important to organizations and should be considered in the organizational literature. The concept of organizational surprises is unpacked on the basis of a typology built...

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of ("; ") equilibrium in which the fraction of players not " optimizing is less than " we show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium...