Consider a setting in which agents can each take one of two ordered actions and in which the incentive of any given agent to take the high action is positively reinforced by the number of other agents that take it. Furthermore, assume that we don't know any other details about the game being...

The classical secretary problem for selecting the best item is studied when the actual values of the items are observed with noise. One of the main appeals of the secretary problem is that the optimal strategy is able to find the best observation with the nontrivial probability of about 0.37,...

Assuming a `spectrum' or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally...

Every continuous-time stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform and limiting-average equilibrium payoff.

Aumann--Serrano (2008) and Foster--Hart (2009) suggest two new riskiness measures, each of which enables one to elicit a complete and objective ranking of gambles according to their riskiness. Hart (2011) shows that both measures can be obtained by looking at a large set of utility functions and...

The dominant computational approach to model operant learning and its underlying neural activity is model-free reinforcement learning (RL). However, there is accumulating behavioral and neuronal-related evidence that human (and animal) operant learning is far more multifaceted. Theoretical...

While the very first consensus protocols for the synchronous model were designed to match the <I>worst-case</I> lower bound, deciding in exactly t+1 rounds in all runs, it was soon realized that they could be strictly improved upon by <I>early stopping</I> protocols. These dominate the first ones, by always...</i></i>

We introduce asymptotic analysis of stochastic games with short-stage duration. The play of stage $k$, $k\geq 0$, of a stochastic game $\Gamma_\delta$ with stage duration $\delta$ is interpreted as the play in time $k\delta\leq t<(k+1)\delta$, and therefore the average payoff of the $n$-stage play per unit of time is the sum of the payoffs in the first $n$ stages divided by $n\delta$, and the $\lambda$-discounted present value of a payoff $g$ in stage $k$ is $\lambda^{k\delta} g$. We define convergence, strong convergence, and exact convergence of the data of a family $(\Gamma_\delta)_{\delta>0}$ as the stage duration $\delta$ goes to $0$, and study the...</(k+1)\delta$,>

Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that <I>prima facie</I> seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer...</i>

Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as <i>women</i> there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each woman possibly blacklisting <i>all but...</i>