On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...

We consider uncoupled dynamics (i.e., dynamics where each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach Pareto efficient and individually rational outcomes. We prove that the number of periods it takes is in the worst case exponential in the number of players.

In CA 1093/07 Bachar v. Fokmann [2009] (request for additional hearing denied, 2010) , the Israeli Supreme Court has formed a formula for calculating the deduction of NII payments from a tort victim's claim, when only some of the victim's impairment is causally linked to the tortious act in...

The purpose of this work is to offer for any zero-sum game with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium, a measure for the risk when deviating from the Nash equilibrium. We present two approaches regarding the nature of deviations; strategic and erroneous. Accordingly, we define two models. In...

The classical Bomber problem concerns properties of the optimal allocation policy of arsenal for an airplane equipped with a given number, n, of anti-aircraft missiles, at a distance t 0 from its destination, which is intercepted by enemy planes appearing according to a homogeneous Poisson...

We consider a fast evolutionary dynamic process on finite stopping games, where each player at each node has at most one move to continue the game. A state is evolutionarily stable if its long-run relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases to zero....

Being a product of evolutionary pressures, it would not be surprising to find that what seems to be a limitation of the cognitive system is actually a fine-tuned compromise between a set of competing needs. This thesis is demonstrated using the case of the limited capacity of short-term memory,...

We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizen are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i. e., functions that map profiles of...

We consider the complexity of finding a Correlated Equilibrium in an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries for players' utilities at pure strategy profiles. Many randomized regret-matching dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium quickly: in...

The Gale-Shapely algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take \Theta(n^2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only \Theta(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a...