We present a fictitious-play model of bargaining, where two bargainers play the Nash demand game repeatedly. The … division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution. As the bargainers make a more accurate comparison of payoffs and become … bargaining solution. …

-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution when the bargainers are patient. As the … division of the Nash bargaining solution. …

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one-sided early commitment power the … simultaneously the (a)symmetric Nash(1950)-bargaining solution, however, predicts (more or less) equal shares. Relying on a …

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining experiment where … proposer. In additional treatments we investigate bargaining situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. …

In his classic article An Essay on Bargaining Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather … than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …