This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private...

We show that creditors do not just ensure that inefficient investment is not undertaken, but also do not preclude efficient investment. Examining what happens following a debt covenant violation, a situation through which creditors acquire some control rights over the firm, we find that...

This paper examines the reliability of information provided by certification intermediaries, such as rating agencies in the context of both a monopolistic and a duopolistic certification industry. It demonstrates that, in a simple model where the intermediary is concerned about reputation and...

This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public...

We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new...

This paper examines how accounting audits impact investment decisions in the presence of agency conflicts. Investors choose between a short-term risk-free asset and a long-term risky project. The manager in charge of the latter has incentives to inflate interim payoffs to be able to continue a...

We estimate the extent to which idiosyncratic and disaggregate macro shocks (such as regional and industry shocks) are not shared in the economy. Comparing the degree to which idiosyncratic and disaggregate macro shocks are not shared grants a deeper understanding as to why the economy lacks in...