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Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them if they are perceived to have failed. To be publicly sacked as a failure is painful, often severely so, but the pain is finite. Agents thus have loss...
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Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them. Agents thus have loss functions which are bounded above. We work with a bell loss function which has this property. With additive uncertainty the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005251969
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Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents.  The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them.  Agents thus have loss functions which are bounded above.  We work with a bell loss function which has this property.  With additive uncertainty the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102454
The recent crisis underlined that proper estimation of distress-dependence amongst banks in a global system is essential for financial stability assessment. We present a set of banking stability measures embedding banks’ linear (correlation) and nonlinear distress-dependence, and their changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744840
This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003, 2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744867
We show, in an exchange economy with default, liquidity constraints and no aggregate uncertainty, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). Two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745061
Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious interrelationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745128