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Looming large or seeming small? : attitudes towards losses in a representative sample

Chapman, Jonathan; Snowberg, Erik; Wang, Stephanie; … - 2022

We measure individual-level loss aversion using three incentivized, representative surveys of the U.S. population (combined N = 3,000). We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant, with many participants accepting negative-expected-value gambles. This is counter to earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013284901

Don't hate the player, hate the game : uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Ryvkin, … - 2016

who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548973

Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion

Daido, Kohei; Morita, Kimiyuki; Murooka, Takeshi; … - School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University - 2013

We analyze a simple task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on the state. If the agents have standard concave utility, the principal assigns the task to an agent with the highest productivity in each state. In contrast, if the agents are loss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902089

Loss Aversion, Stochastic Compensation, and Team Incentives

Daido, Kohei; Murooka, Takeshi - School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University - 2013

We investigate moral-hazard problems with limited liability where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences. We show that stochastic compensation for low performance can be optimal. Because of loss aversion, the agents have first-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902090

Task assignment under agent loss aversion

Daido, Kohei; Morita, Kimiyuki; Murooka, Takeshi; … - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 1, pp. 35-38

We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702791

Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Ryvkin, … - 2016

who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011622776

Endogenous Claims and Collective Production : An Experimental Study on the Timing of Profit-Sharing Negotiations and Production

Baranski, Andrzej - 2018

We explore the efficiency and distributive implications (theoretically and experimentally) of a multilateral bargaining model with endogenous production of the surplus under two different timings: ex ante and ex post bargaining. Both timings are commonly observed in business partnerships and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936225

Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

three mechanisms with the appropriate distribution of prizes. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment and … behavior in all mechanisms is consistent with basic directional and reinforcement learning. -- tournament ; reward ; punishment … ; promotion ; firing ; contract ; experiment ; learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743404

State coercion and control aversion : an internet study in East and West Germany

Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - 2019 - This version: September 2019

Do politico-economic systems influence how control affects motivation? We hypothesize that control aversion, meaning crowding-out of intrinsic motivation due to enforcement, has evolved less under the coercive regime of East Germany than under the liberal regime of West Germany. We test this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012312305

The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

Danilov, Anastasia; Biemann, Torsten; Kring, Thorn; … - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2012

In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842856