We construct a new systemic risk measure that quantifies vulnerability to fire-sale spillovers using detailed regulatory balance sheet data for U.S. commercial banks and repo market data for broker-dealers. Even for moderate shocks in normal times, fire-sale externalities can be substantial. For...

In this article, we discuss and analyse the main components of a digital financial supervisory system with supervisory technology (SupTech). This work offers a new SupTech definition and configures the digital pillars of a financial supervisory system. We contribute to the TECHs in Finance...

The paper analyses the current national and international regulatory regimes relevant for European banks, CSDs and ICSDs, and compares them with the requirements in order to answer the following questions: Is there any overlap between the provisions of the CPSS-IOSCO. Recommendations and the...

We propose a simple network–based methodology for ranking systemically important financial institutions. We view the risks of firms –including both the financial sector and the real economy– as a network with nodes representing the volatility shocks. The metric for the connections of the...

We construct a new systemic risk measure that quantifies vulnerability to fire-sale spillovers using detailed regulatory balance sheet data for U.S. commercial banks and repo market data for broker-dealers. Even for moderate shocks in normal times, fire-sale externalities can be substantial. For...

Aim: Recently, central counterparties (CCPs) have gained on popularity due to their positive impact on the financial markets during crisis (limiting contagion on cleared instruments). The post-crisis reforms favored CCPs as risk minimizers. The aim of the article is to critically assess the...

The recent financial crisis has shown that financial innovation can have devastating systemic impacts. International standard setters' and national regulators' response has been a global concerted effort to overhaul and tighten financial regulations. However, at a time of designing stricter...

Policymakers justify bailing out major financial firms by saying those firms are 'too big to fail.' They argue that such failure would subject the market to 'counterparty contagion' as the failed firms default on their obligations to other firms. But empirical evidence indicates that...

We identify and track over time the factors that make the financial system vulnerable to fire sales by constructing an index of aggregate vulnerability. The index starts increasing quickly in 2004, before most other major systemic risk measures, and triples by 2008. The fire-sale-specific...