Following the emergence of the financial crisis in August 2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established in 2010 a new global regulatory framework. In addition to raising capital requirements, it introduced three ratios, two of which set out minimum standards for liquidity and...

This paper investigates the costs and benefits of liquidity regulation. We find that liquidity tools are beneficial but cannot completely remove the need for Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) interventions by the central bank. Full compliance with current Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable...

We develop a model in which financial intermediaries hold liquidity to protect themselves from shocks. Depending on parameter values, banks may choose to hold too much or too little liquidity on aggregate compared with the socially optimal amount. The model endogenously generates a situation of...

We study how monetary policy affects the funding composition of the banking sector. When monetary tightening reduces the retail deposit supply owing to, for example, a decrease in bank reserves or in money demand, banks try to substitute the deposit outflows with more wholesale funding in order...

We examine the system-wide effects of liquidity regulation on banks' balance sheets. In the general equilibrium model, banks have to hold liquid assets, and choose among illiquid assets varying in the extent to which they are difficult to value before maturity, e.g., structured securities. By...

Under Basel III rules, banks become subject to a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) from 2015 onwards, to promote short-term resilience. We investigate the effects of such liquidity regulation on bank liquid assets and liabilities. Results indicate co-integration of liquid assets and liabilities, to...

This paper discusses whether financial intermediaries can optimally provide liquidity, or whether the government has a role in creating liquidity by supplying government securities. We discuss a model in which intermediaries optimally manage liquidity with outside rather than inside liquidity:...

This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed...