Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong...

This paper studies an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Our main goal is to see if a price system can function well in an economy (e.g., an economy with complementary preferences) that does not have a Walrasian equilibrium. We study the price adjustment processes governed by the Euler...

We provide two novel dynamic double auction (DA) mechanisms for a class of economies and study their convergence property to competitive equilibrium. For DA mechanisms, we find a parameter on the two sequences of the marginal bid increments (bid step-size) and ask decrements (ask step-size) that...

A new FIR filter is designed to date U.S. recessions with the unemployment rate and the Conference Board employment trend index. Our approach is simple but one can see from the curve the dynamic process how the economy moves from one business cycle to the next. We also present a new use of the...

This paper studies a dual that applies to a class of quasilinear exchange economies with indivisible (or divisible) goods in search for an equilibrium. Our model aims at an economy with a large scale and an agent's revealed demand or supply is contaminated with stochastic errors (noises). Thus,...

Robert Barsky and Jeffrey Miron (1989) revealed the seasonal cycle of the U.S. economy from 1948 to 1985 was characterized by a "bubble-like" expansion in the second and fourth quarters, a "crash-like" contraction in the first quarter, and a mild contraction in the third quarter. We replicate,...

Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong...

Consider a society with a finite number of players. Each player has personal preferences over coalitions in which he joints. A social outcome is a coalition structure that is defined by a partition of the set of players. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M)...