Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of...

The analysis of capital structure and its determinants represents an useful approach for the Romanian and foreign investors and for the companies, at the same time. The main conclusion for capital structure analysis was that Romanian listed companies sustained their assets, in this order, on...

The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders vote in the ratios that they themselves choose. We document an active market...

This paper analyzes a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator ”only” needs to observe total costs and output of all firms. The modified...

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamic auction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders and higher prices when an informed...

We provide evidence that the financing decisions of companies that are audited by a Big Six auditor are less affected by information asymmetry. Specifically, these companies enjoy greater financial flexibility and depend less on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions...

Not only the wealth, but also the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to these great objects, ought to endeavor to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply.Alexander Hamilton,...

This paper analyzes a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator "only" needs to observe total costs and output of all firms. The modified...

I analyze the price discovery, liquidity provision, and transaction-cost components driven by the real-time firm-specific news at the Paris Bourse. I find that the news impact depends on which type of news bulletin is released. Only news items causing extreme price disruptions such as earnings...

We examine the consequences of transparency in an experimental multiple-dealer market with asymmetrically informed dealers. Five professional securities traders make a market for a single security. In each trading round, one of the dealers (the "insider") is told the security's true value. We...