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Consumers are rarely sure of the exact standard that product labels and other certificates of quality represent. We show that any such uncertainty creates a “Groucho effect” in which seeing that a product has a label leads consumers to infer that the standard for the label itself is not very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453629
such communication is that it takes on one of two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: 1) disclosure of quality … general, these two literatures have ignored one-another. In this paper we argue that disclosure and signaling are two sides of … integration of these two alternatives leads to a number of new implications about disclosure, signaling, firm preferences over …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752756
-nicotine brands decreased due to the disclosure of nicotine and tar content in 1967 and the labeling warnings in 1972, however … but decreased in 1972, and consumers had switched to prefer low-tar brands after 1972. Disclosure did not reduce the … intake of nicotine but reduced the intake of tar, accordingly disclosure may benefit consumers by reducing the health risk as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005575051
dragnets; student rankings; constraints on information disclosure at trial; electricity and water usage during periods of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595886
lower full marginal cost. We characterize the firm�s equilibrium disclosure and pricing behavior, and compare that … behavior and the associated welfare to what would occur under a regime of mandatory disclosure. We derive a range of disclosure … costs that would induce a high-safety firm to choose disclosure over signaling. When the firm�s full marginal cost is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595892
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612420
Is it always wise to disclose good news? We find that the worst sender with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the good news is attainable by sufficiently mediocre types, or if the sender is already expected to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696155
disclosure is to reduce treacherous advice. Our results show that timing actually matters: subsequent transparency significantly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773011
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550
We present a trading game with one insider, many outsiders, liquidity traders and a competitive market maker trading an asset with two value components, a private and a shared one, in a market operating as in Kyle (1985). The insider knows both value components and outsiders only know the shared...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597520