In a bonus-malus system in car insurance, the bonus class of a customer is updated from one year to the next as a function of the current class and the number of claims in the year (assumed Poisson). Thus the sequence of classes of a customer in consecutive years forms a Markov chain, and most...

We study the undeclared work patterns of Hungarian employees in relatively stable jobs, using a panel dataset that matches individual-level self-reported Labour Force Survey data with administrative records of the Pension Directorate for 2001–2006. We estimate the determinants of undeclared...

This paper discusses nonparametric kernel regression with the regressor being a d-dimensional ß-null recurrent process in presence of conditional heteroscedasticity. We show that the mean function estimator is consistent with convergence rate p n(T)hd, where n(T) is the number of regenerations...

We study the undeclared work patterns of Hungarian employees in relatively stable jobs, using a panel dataset that matches individual-level self-reported Labour Force Survey (LFS) data with administrative data from the Pension Directorate for 2001-2006. We estimate the determinants of undeclared...

This paper improves previous sufficient conditions for stationarity obtained in the context of a general nonlinear vector autoregressive model with nonlinear autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. The results are proved by using the stability theory developed for Markov chains....

We examine the upward labor income mobility of men and women in Germany using the GSOEP Cross National Equivalent File. Women have greater overall income mobility. However, utilizing a measure of upward income mobility and calculating the posterior probability that men's upward income mobility...

In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...

In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...