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In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated...
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This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403580
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297
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Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2002, Annals of Operations Research 109, 213–227) proposed a modification of the Banzhaf value for games where a coalition structure is given. In this paper we present a method to compute this value by means of the multilinear extension of the game. A...
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