The paper analyzes the conditions under which the smaller of two otherwise identical countries prefers the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to a situation of fully harmonized tax rates. A standard two-country model of capital tax competition is extended by allowing for transaction costs,...

The paper discusses the main arguments for destination- versus origin-based commodity taxation in the European Community's Internal Market. Destination-based solutions necessarily distort commodity trade in the Community because final con-sumer purchases can only be taxed in the origin country....

An optimal taxation approach is employed to discuss the interaction between factor and commodity taxes for a small open economy when profit-earning firms are mobile internationally. In this framework, a destination-based commodity tax is shown to be superior to an origin-based VAT from an...

The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good which is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax region and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given and an asymmetry is introduced through...

A two-sector trade model with perfect international capital mobility and endogenous supply of specific factors is used to analyze the relation between selective taxes on production (origin-based commodity taxes) and source-based taxes on capital income. A small open economy will set both of...

A widely noticed result by de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) states that asymmetric commodity tax competition always leads to tax rates being too low in both countries, even though there are counteracting tax base and terms of trade effects. This note argues that the result depends crucially on...

The paper analyzes the implications of allowing for trade deflection under the restricted origin principle. It is shown that (a) producer trade deflection leads to circular trade and must be ruled out to obtain a trade equilibrium, (b) consumer trade deflection will not occur in a Nash...

We analyze tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will always...

The paper sets up an analytical framework within which the arguments for centralized vs. decentralized tax policy can be represented and weighed against each other. Two aspects of the debate are considered: first, the global welfare effects of 'harmonizing' tax reforms are discussed when...