In the first essay, we analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice...

We introduce a new notion of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) called maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE), which is based on the maximin expected utility (MEU) formulation. In particular, agents maximize maximin expected utility conditioned on their own private information and...

This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the new notions we introduce.

The conflict between Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal (efficient) allocations are not incentive compatible is a fundamental fact in information economics, mechanism design and general equilibrium with asymmetric information. This important...