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trust game” in parallel with a finitely repeated “microcredit game.” There are two agent types: “regular” and “trustworthy … (modeled by the level of trust) in the community where the group lending programs are located. Agents play a finitely repeated … conditions under which the presence of trust as an equilibrium of the trust game can enhance the success of the group lending …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137899
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607418
In recent years, microfinance institutions have expanded into group lending with individual liability, leaving out the … repay a group loan to safeguard their reputation. We show that the introduction of group loans with individual liability … importance to their reputation will select into individual liability loans, causing default rates and interest rates to rise for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010460844
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369123
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasirandom group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011150211
Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264866
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282737
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791873
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasirandom group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005548085
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357755