Abstract: We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may...

We consider an organization with two projects which have productive spillovers. Three agents are active in this organization: two agents, each specialized in one project, and the CEO, who is a generalist. The organization owner first allocates authority over each project to these three...

This paper studies a model of search engine competition with endogenous obfuscation. Platforms may differ in the quality of their search algorithms. I study the impact of this heterogeneity in consumer surplus, seller profits and platform revenue. I show that the dominant platform will typically...

We study the interaction between algorithmic advice and human decisions using high-resolution hotel-room pricing data. We document that price setting frictions, arising from adjustment costs of human decision makers, induce a conflict of interest with the algorithmic advisor. A model of advice...

This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in...

We provide a new framework to identify demand elasticities in markets where managers rely on algorithmic recommendations for price setting, and apply it to a dataset containing bookings for a sample of mid-sized hotels in Europe. Using non-binding algorithmic price recommendations and observed...