This article analyzes the manifold situations in which the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) has influenced — or has failed to influence — federal securities regulation and state corporate law, and the prospective roles for the EMH in these contexts. In federal securities regulation, the EMH...

We model a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading platform with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor's order is informative about the asset's payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor use this...

Will arbitrage capital flow into markets experiencing shocks, mitigating adverse effects on price efficiency? Not necessarily. In a dynamic model with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, price efficiency plays a dual role, determining both the profitability of new arbitrage and...

We present a model where quantitative trading − trading strategies based on the quantitative analysis of prices, volumes, and other asset and market characteristics − is systematically profitable for sophisticated traders whose only source of private information is knowing better than other...

We model a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading platform with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor's order is informative about the asset's payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor use this...

This article analyzes the manifold situations in which the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) has influenced—or has failed to influence—federal securities regulation and state corporate law, and the prospective roles for the EMH in these contexts. In federal securities regulation, the EMH has...

The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...

The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...

We study price efficiency and trading behavior in laboratory limit order markets with asymmetrically informed traders. Markets differ in the number of insiders present and in the subset of traders who receive information about the number of insiders present. We observe that price efficiency (i)...

We demonstrate that asymmetric information between sellers (loan originators) and purchasers (investors and securities issuers) of commercial mortgages gives rise to a standard “lemons problem”, whereby portfolio lenders use private information to liquidate lower quality loans in CMBS...