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Barilla, César; Gonçalves, Duarte - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 365-405

We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536977

Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimisation Problem

Martins, Ana Paula - 2010

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players’ splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496138

Peaceful Agreements to Share a River

van den Brink, Rene; Nevrekar, Saish - 2020

This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we consider countries that are located along a river and made a military investment. Given these investments and their location along the river, they sequentially bargain over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233978

Ukrainekrieg: Strafzölle als effektives Instrument

Eichstädt, Tilman - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 102 (2022) 5, pp. 325

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013343097

Trade, Insecurity, and the Costs of Conflict

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - 2022

Typically, economics assumes that property rights over productive resources or goods are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced. The costs of insecurity and the resultant conflict are, however, real and often economically significant. In this paper, we examine how international trade regimes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470292

International Trade and Stable Resolutions of Resource Disputes

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Syropoulos, Constantinos - 2022

We consider a dynamic setting in which two sovereign states with overlapping ownership claims on a resource/asset ﬁrst arm and then choose whether to resolve their dispute violently through war or peacefully through settlement. Both approaches depend on the states' military capacities, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470299

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Wärneryd, Karl - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435790

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845

Does inequality lead to conflict?

Dutta, Indranil; Mishra, Ajit - 2005

-monotonic. – conflict ; wealth inequality ; Nash bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284613

Indivisibility, fairness, farsightedness and their implications for security

Murshed, S. Mansoob - 2006

This paper is concerned with the problems of achieving lasting peace. One dimension includes fairly sharing the post-war economic and political pie or the peace dividend. This requires post-war allocations that are envy free. Many peace agreements that end civil wars are notoriously unstable in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284789