experiments that our distributed negotiation strategy yields performance sufficiently close to the Nash bargaining solution, and …

In bargaining and negotiations, should one make the first offer or wait for the opponent to do it? Practitioners … support the idea that moving first in bargaining is a mistake, while researchers find strong evidence that first …-mover advantages appear in very reasonable and realistic bargaining situations. Among other results, it is also found that second …

We study the effect of the transparency of outside options in bilateral bargaining. A seller posts prices to screen a …

This paper analyzes reputational bargaining between two parties who can strategically send an ultimatum to resolve the …

I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is …

This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining … higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties …

To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in … transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in preventing efficient outcomes and we show that delay in bargaining … generically occurs. In an application to legislative bargaining with vote buying, if a veto player and a non-veto player coexist …

This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by characterizing … bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from bargaining theory. In particular, we derive new axiomatic characterizations of the …

-management bargaining, pretrial negotiations, and international negotiations. I compute the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms …, the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism, as well as the neutral bargaining solution. I numerically illustrate that the … neutral bargaining solution as the unique, robust solution among all interim incentive efficient mechanisms …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …