In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model we allow for mediation in which the informed agent reports one possible element of a partition to a mediator (a communication device) and then the mediator suggests an action to the uninformed decision-maker according to the...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a...

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we provice that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated...

We consider 2 x 2 games like Battle of the Sexes and Chicken, to test whether or not players are able to coordinate on pure Nash equilibria following recommendations from correlation devices. We use two different correlation devices, public and private, for these games, with the same expected...

For duopoly models, we consider the notion of weak correlation using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nashcentric devices involving a sunspot structure are simple symmetric weak correlated equilibria. Any small...