that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

theoretic model showing how endogenous emotion-based punishment can sustain ull cooperation when interactions are not repeated …

laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured …

systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …

preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized … peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an …

situation. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual … inflated beliefs about the contribution of others. This, in turn, impacts their contribution and punishment decisions. …

compliance: punishment and reputation. The model considers two groups of agents in a society with one norm. Agents in one group … enforced due to a higher level of punishment of the violation. In another scenario, everyone is motivated due to reputation … formation, despite a lower level of punishment by others. The interaction of two mechanisms provides a convenient way to norm …