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To friends everything, to strangers the law? : an experiment on contract enforcement and group identity

Panganiban, Marian - 2015

Although the role of formal and informal institutions in promoting economic growth and sustaining exchange relations is now well established, explaining and differentiating how informal and formal rules affect individual behavior remain a challenge. This study aims to distill the essential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349339

Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments

Brookins, Philip; Lucas, Adriana; Ryvkin, Dmitry - Department of Economics, Florida State University - 2014

Overconfidence in one's relative performance within a group is a wide-spread phenomenon. Similar to individual (or within-group) overconfidence, it was also shown that individuals are, on average, overconfident about the performance of their group relative to other groups. We hypothesize that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902505

Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments

Brookins, Philip; Lucas, Adriana; Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 44 (2014) C, pp. 1-12

Individuals belonging to a social group make judgments about their relative standing within the group as well as about the relative standing of their group among other groups. On average, individuals exhibit overconfidence bias in both types of judgments in a variety of settings. We hypothesize,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051357

Social Norms, Endogenous Sorting and the Culture of Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2018

systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872060

Social Norms, Endogenous Sorting and the Culture of Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2018

preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized … peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873461

Creating an efficient culture of cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2017

that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the … people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce … social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011784301

Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011786981

Employee incentives : bonuses or penalties? : penalty contracts lead to higher productivity than performance-based bonuses, but at the cost of employer/staff relations

Nosenzo, Daniele - 2016

incentives as entitlements that can be lost by failing to reach a performance target, rather than as additional rewards that can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011433993

Reciprocity : Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate

Guala, Francesco - 2011

Strong Reciprocity theorists claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment … costly punishment raises cooperation in laboratory conditions. Its efficacy in the field however is controversial. I … theorists is unsupported by ethnographic evidence on decentralised punishment and by historical evidence on common pool …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133295

Fooling the Nice Guys: The effect of lying about contributions on public good provision and punishment

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Ter Meer, Janna - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2012

laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842857