We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group's size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

The topic of reforms is hotly debated among politicians and researchers. There are many approaches to explore the origins of reform deadlocks and budget deficits. Central to all these approaches are the costs generated either by the Status Quo or by eliminating the Status Quo via a reform. Costs...

This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to in uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future states of the economy and have to rely on...

This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future states of the economy and have to rely on...