We develop a tractable model of the allocation of ownership and control in firms in competitive markets that permits study of how the scarcity of assets in the market translates into control allocations inside the organization. The model identifies a price-like mechanism whereby local liquidity...

We model technological progress as an external effect of organizational design, focusing on how factories, based on labor division, could spawn the Industrial Revolution. Dividing labor, as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by observers of production processes. However, entrepreneurs...

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate...

We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known. Necessary conditions, which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function, are also...

This paper examines possible effects of college admission policy on general equilibrium outcomes at the high school stage. Specifically, we investigate whether a policy that bases college admission on relative performance at high school could modify in the aggregate the degree of segregation in...

This article presents a perfectly competitive model of firm boundary decisions and study their interplay with product demand, technology, and welfare. Integration is privately costly but is effective at coordinating production decisions; nonintegration is less costly but coordinates relatively...

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff...

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Incentive-based wealth effects arises from lower bounds on wealth and utility, and these affect the way in which different organizational forms can divide the proceeds of production. Individuals may...

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Incentive-based wealth effects arises from lower bounds on wealth and utility, and these affect the way in which different organizational forms can divide the proceeds of production. Individuals may...

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate...