It is generally presumed that strengthening the legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This presumption is based on an implicit assumption of infinitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic...

Introducción. La teoría neoclásica tradicional trata la empresa como una "caja negra". Se la enfoca como una función de producción que transforma los insumos en productos de una manera exógena. Sin embargo. el trabajo empírico de Abramovitz, Solow, y Denison sobre los determinantes del...

This paper explores the role of differing contractual relationships between sugarcane farmers and sugar factories in india resulting from differing ownership structures. In Maharashtra most sugar factories are cooperatively owned by cane farmers, while in Utter Pradesh most factories are...

In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in...

When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality "in utility and consumption" is inevitable in "any" steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However,...

Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor...