We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible.Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize three cardinality-based rules which arise naturally in this dichotomous setting.They are what we call the symmetric...

The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

AMS Classifications: 91A06; 91A10; 91A12

The concede-and-divide rule is a basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants.An extension of the concede-and-divide rule to bankruptcy problems with more than two claimants is provided.This extension not only uses the concede-and-divide principle in its procedural definition, but...

We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty.We use a...

The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf.Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency.This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities.To capture the features of...

We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as...