This paper investigates the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process in poor countries. We build a simple model where tax officials and firms bargain over bribes to let firms evade part of their taxes. Using a unique dataset on Ugandan firms we test the...

This paper empirically examines the demand and supply sides of bribery using World Bank Enterprise Survey data on 18,005 firms in 75 developing countries. It assesses the determinants of firms' bribe paying behavior and examine how bribe behavior affects two main sectors where corruption is...

This paper empirically examines the demand and supply sides of bribery using World Bank Enterprise Survey data on 18,005 firms in 75 developing countries. It assesses the determinants of firms' bribe paying behavior and examine how bribe behavior affects two main sectors where corruption is...

The paper investigates the conflict that arises between the government, its bureaucrats and businesses in the tax collection process. We examine the effect of fiscal policy and corruption control mechanisms on the prevalence of tax evasion and corruption behaviour, and their impact on firm...

This article develops a simple framework to analyse the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process. We show that the larger the bribe a firm offers to a tax collector, the larger the tax rebate it gets. More particularly, we show that the negotiation over bribe and...

Quebec’s forests represent 20% of the Canadian forest and 2% of world forests. They play a major role for habitat preservation, supplying goods and services to the population. Climate change will have an impact on the forest through inter alia increased droughts, forest fires, warmer weather...