it was originally thought of. Instead, we find patterns of collusion among the major manufacturing groups in Italy …

international – antitrust policy; however, the formal proof that a cartel really functioned economically and did not only exist in a …, focusing on legal proof of a cartel is fruitless unless collusion resulted in excess profits or excess revenues. This economic … in spring 2003, the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) fined the German cement industry – € 661 million for having established …

join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated … markets may become easier as market concentration falls, and that market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms … can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price (and thereby raising that …

international – antitrust policy; however, the formal proof that a cartel really functioned economically and did not only exist in a …, focusing on legal proof of a cartel is fruitless unless collusion resulted in excess profits or excess revenues. This economic … in spring 2003, the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) fined the German cement industry – € 661 million for having established …

) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some fringe firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and … group of firms competes against independent fringe rivals. The market is surveilled by an antitrust authority that has three … different policy instruments at its disposal: Ensuring free market access, obstructing collusion, and discouraging collusion …