We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with...

This Paper analyses strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to...

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 and 1987) by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as job centres and newspapers in the labour market, or real estate agents in the housing...

This paper provides a bargaining aspect into the analysis of intellectual property protection across borders. We investigate the conditions under which a mutually accepted level of intellectual property enforcement can be agreed upon between two negotiating governments. We also explore the...

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games...

This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfllled propose to other...

We provide an equilibrium analysis of a wage bargaining model between a union and a firm in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of a disagreement. While in the literature it is assumed that the parties of wage bargaining have constant discount factors, in our model...

We consider a non-cooperative price bargaining model between a monopolistic producer and a monopsonic consumer. The innovative element that our model brings to the existing literature on price negotiation concerns the parties' preferences which are not expressed by constant discount rates, but...

We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we consider a model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of...

We investigate a wage bargaining between the union and the firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruuistic where a hostile union...