Captive insurance companies are ‘in-house' (re)insurance companies formed with the specific objective of insuring the risks of their parent company and/or its affiliated companies. This alternative form of risk management is potentially or in fact an efficient means through which large listed...

This study examines the relation of incentives and risk taking for 104 listed U.S. insurance companies over 2006-2010. Our results show that independent director compensation is positively related to risk taking as are CEO compensation and institutional ownership. Besides dollar value and...

The paper analyzes insurance contracts where the benefits of the insured depend on the performance of an investment strategy and which guarantee a certain interest rate on the contributions made by the insured. The insured has to decide simultaneously on the investment strategy and the guarantee...

In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new...

This study examines the relation between incentives and risk taking for 466 insurer-year observations over 2006-2010. Our results show that independent director compensation is positively related to risk taking as is CEO compensation and institutional ownership. Besides dollar value and...

The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF?s objective is to safeguard its resources and be...

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

This paper proposes a principal-agent framework to study the optimal transfer of longevity risk between a reinsurer and a hedger under information asymmetry. Most hedgers in the real world have rather small portfolios which are hard to be accurately estimated by the reinsurer. Using indemnity...

Pricing is integral to insurance design, directly influencing firm behavior and moral hazard, though its effects are insufficiently understood. I study a quasi experiment in which deposit insurance premiums were changed for U.S. banks with staggered timing, generating differentials between banks...