In this paper we look at the effects of bargaining power on the types of entrepreneurial projects chosen by venture capitalists and show that a wealth-constrained venture capitalist prefers to provide equity financing to a two-stage rather than to a similar single-stage project. While the...

Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant relationships with the...

Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant relationships with the...

Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant relationships with the...

Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant relationships with the...

This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the...

In this paper we look at the effects of bargaining power on the types of entrepreneurial projects chosen by venture capitalists and show that a wealth-constrained venture capitalist prefers to provide equity financing to a two-stage rather than to a similar single-stage project. While the...

In this paper we look at the effects of bargaining power on the types of entrepreneurial projects chosen by venture capitalists and show that a wealth-constrained venture capitalist prefers to provide equity financing to a two-stage rather than to a similar single-stage project. While the...

This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the...