This paper deals with the funding of cultural activities, describing and analyzing the arguments that justify the State's participation in this funding. It analyzes the critics who claim to have been the cultural policies in Brazil left to the market due to the primacy of tax incentives, part of...

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight...

The future institutional environment for the co-existence of genetically modified (GM) crops, conventional crops and organic crops in Europe combines measures of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules. Against this background we ask the following two questions: How does ex-ante...

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On...

With the goal of reducing the dependency on oil revenues, the Government of Kazakhstan has recently increased its budget allocations to prop up the domestic agricultural sector. Yet, many observers agree that it is less the amount of public spending that induces long-term growth than the quality...

What would a ‘good’ industrial policy in the realm of cotton production look like? This article seeks to address this question through a focus on reforms to the cotton sector in Kazakhstan. In contrast with neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, administrators in Kazakhstan had widely...

This paper deals with the funding of cultural activities, describing and analyzing the arguments that justify the State's participation in this funding. It analyzes the critics who claim to have been the cultural policies in Brazil left to the market due to the primacy of tax incentives, part of...

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight...

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On...