We propose a new geometric approach for the analysis of cooperative games. A cooperative game is viewed as a real valued function $u$ defined on a finite set of points in the unit simplex. We define the \emph{concavification} of $u$ on the simplex as the minimal concave function on the simplex...

Two players play an unknown zero-sum repeated game. Before the game starts one player may receive signals, whose nature is specified by an information structure, regarding the game actually played. We characterize when one information structure is better for the maximizer than another. We also...

A geometric approach, analogous to the approach used in the additive case, is proposed to determine the conditional expectation with non- additive probabilities. The conditional expectation is then applied for (i) updating the probability when new information becomes available; and (ii) defining...

We present a model of categorization based on prototypes. A prototype is an image or template of an idealized member of the category. Once a set of prototypes is defined, entities are sorted into categories on the basis of the prototypes they are closest to. We provide a characterization of...

A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. It is shown that such an order that satisfies some plausible axioms can be represented by a quantum probability in two cases: pure state and uniform measure.

We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that...