We deal with the concept of e-consistent equilibrium which corresponds to strategies inducing an e-equilbrium in any subgame reached along the play path. Examples and existence conditions are given.

In a Bayesian game some players might receive a noisy signal regarding the specific game actually being played before it starts. We study zero-sum games where each player receives a partial information about his own type and no information about that of the other player and analyze the impact...

The approachability theorem of Blackwell (1956b) is extended to infinite dimensional spaces. Two players play a sequential game whose payoffs are random variables. A set C of random variables is said to be approachable by player 1 if he has a strategy that ensures that the difference between the...

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...