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The approachability theorem of Blackwell (1956b) is extended to infinite dimensional spaces. Two players play a sequential game whose payoffs are random variables. A set C of random variables is said to be approachable by player 1 if he has a strategy that ensures that the difference between the...
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Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do*...
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Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...
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A new integral for capacities, different from the Choquet integral, is introduced and characterized. The main feature of the new integral is concavity, which might be interpreted as uncertainty aversion. The integral is then extended to fuzzy capacities, which assign subjective expected values...
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Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash...
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Global games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subsets) of the set of players. They capture "public good" aspects of cooperation, i.e. situations where the payoff is naturally defined for all players ("the globe") together, as is the cause with issues of environmental...
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Under the rational expectation s assumption of Muth, economic agents use their perfect knowledge of the distribution of future prices to compute optimal current actions. In private forecasts equilibrium, intorduced here, agents use subjective in accurate forecasts about future prices to compute...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824682