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We provide a simple proof of Foster's (1983) characterization of the Theil inequality index.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272239
In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263568
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We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146795
This paper is concerned with distributions of income and the ordering of related Lorenz curves. By introducing appropriate preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves, two altenative axiomatic characterization of Lorenz curve orderings are proposed. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005148388
The problem of aggregating preferences over two alternatives is considered. Three axioms are postulated: unanimity, reducibility (two divergent preferences can be replaced by their aggregation), and anonymity. It is shown that only twelve aggregation rules satisfy the three axioms: the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421772
Two axioms are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when preferences are defined over two alternatives. According to one axiom, if all the individuals in a group are indifferent, then the associated group preference is indifference. The second axiom states that a group S prefers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692949
In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the $\mathcal{B}$-core and the $\mathcal{M}$-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs $(x, \mathcal{B}), $ where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604658
We axiomatically characterize the Theil ordering of income inequality. In addition to the uncontroversial axioms of anonymity, homogeneity, replication invariance, strong directedness, and a standard continuity property, we appeal to both an independence and a decomposability axioms. These two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010728080
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