We consider a committee with common interests. Committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best, but each member may acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule. In the lab, as predicted by Bayesian equilibrium, voters are...

We study the effciency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, equal cost sharing is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-budgetde…cit...

We study a class of boundedly rational choice functions, namely two-stage choosers, which operate as follows. The decision maker uses two criteria in two stages to make a choice. First she shortlists the top-2 alternatives, i.e. two ?nalists, according to one criterion. Next, she chooses the...

We study the impact on the size of the informal sector of a tax levied on formal workers, and transfers that may be distributed to both formal and informal workers alike. We build a search model that features an informal sector and we calibrate it to data from Mexico. We investigate whether...

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with default and collateral requirements. In contrast with previous literature, our model allows for liquidity contractions and general prepayment specifications. We show that liquidity substantially affects credit and prepayment risks, and...

We estimate the crowding out of private transfers caused by 70 y Más, a public assistance program for the rural elderly in Mexico for whom private support is an important source of income. Using data from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey and a triple differences approach, we find that...

In this paper we introduce communication into intergroup ultimatum bargaining in a lab. The responder groups vote whether to accept the proposals with unanimity required either for acceptance or for rejection. In contrast with the no-communication results reported in our previous study...

I characterize the set of implementable allocation functions in the standard one dimensional mechanism design environment where the relationship between private information and payoffs is possibly non-monotone. The characterization is useful in two aspects. First it leads to a rather mild...

Classical de?nitions of complementarity are based on cross price elasticities, and so they do not apply when goods are free. This context includes many relevant cases such as online newspapers and public facilities. We look for a complementarity notion for free goods that is: behavioural (based...

We provide a framework to evaluate whether or not a seller can increase his revenue in interacting with a privately informed buyer by using money-back guarantees (MBGs). The buyer's value for the good exhibits fi risk and his type is multidimensional giving the probability of Öt as well as the...