We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis,...

It is received financial wisdom that when there is free entry by speculators, it is impossible to generate net profits on publicly available information. In this paper we study a version of the standard Kyle (85) model with endogenous information acquisition and we find that equilibria exist...

In the light of the exponential growth of the Internet and World Wide Web, this paper describes, in some detail, existing agents and multiagents applications in the context of e-commerce, and suggests a research agenda for economists in response to these changes in technology and lifestyle....

With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for thier users, to write the small print of an agrement and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But srious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In this...

This study provides first empirical results on entrepreneurs’ negotiation behavior. In a series of negotiation tasks, we compare persuasive behaviors and negotiation outcomes of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Our results show that entrepreneurs make extensive use of emotions and...

We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis,...