This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behaviors. Specifically, under certain conditions such as private values and ``rich'' interdependent values, we show that implementation in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies, a...

We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world...

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this...

We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential...

We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other...