A bilateral trading mechanism is evaluated according to the level of expected welfare guaranteed when agents play weakly undominated strategies. We show that, if a finite mechanism guarantees expected welfare W, this is also achieved by the truth-telling strategy profile in a revelation...

We consider a cheap-talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender's bias parameter is only “approximately common knowledge” in the sense of (a variant of) Monderer and Samet (1989). Compared to the standard case where the structure of the bias parameter is common knowledge,...

In our main article, Miura and Yamashita (2014) ("On the possibility of information transmission"), we have shown in a cheap-talk environment that "assuming full revelation in a common-knowledge environment" implies a very different conclusion for models with slight misspeci fication in the...

We consider games where an analyst is not confident about players' true information structure for payoff-relevant parameters. We define a robust prediction by a set of action profiles such that, given any information structure among the players, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given that...