Coordination problems are easily solved when there are clear and unambiguous signals. Institutional mechanisms that enhance the clarity of signals enables even cheap talk to work as a coordinating mechanism. On the other hand, learning about signals, especially if there is path-dependent noise...

An explanation of leadership within a particular class of institutions is developed. The institutions of interest are non-hierarchical, endow their leaders with few formal powers, and are hampered by principal-agent problems. The explanation proceeds in two stages.First, game-theoretic models of...

"Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institution free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e., where no cost-induced equilibrium...

"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power lies with predicting the behavior of large groups --...