This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash...

The foundation of insurance in the frequentist framework is well-understood by experts in actuarial science, insurance and risk management. In the past two decades there has been a surge in the application of Bayesian analysis in insurance. However, the foundation of insurance under the Bayesian...

The asymmetric information problem has been widely discussed in the context of insurance markets. Most of previous research usually treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though it is quite possible that they may coexist and interact with each other. In this paper, we build a...

This articles re-examines a standard result on the demand for insurance ("full coverage with a fair premium and partial coverage with a loaded premium"') in the presence of a default risk. It is established that the optimal insurance coverage is always partial coverage if the default is total,...

Most of the previous research in the asymmetric information problem treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though they may coexist and interact with each other. We build a principal-agent model to examine optimal contracts in a competitive insurance market facing adverse selection...

Empirical studies on asymmetric information have mainly focused on primary insurance markets, but comparatively little attention has been given to reinsurance markets. This study investigates the existence of asymmetric information by testing for a positive correlation between coverage and ex...