We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player's ex-post preferences over outcomes to depend on opponents' actions. We show that preference rationalizability is invariant to...

An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very...

For binary-action supermodular games with a continuum of symmetric players, we show that simple global game information structures can be used to implement an optimal outcome under adversarial equilibrium selection

We characterize global game selections in binary-action supermodular games in terms of sequential obedience: it is shown that an action profile of a binary-action supermodular game is a (possibly noise-dependent) global game selection if and only if it satisfies strict sequential obedience and...

We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...