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effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives …We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition …, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738296
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402238
effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives …We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition …, securitization mitigates winner's curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073906
Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyershave no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has accessto new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, thelender may either borrow using her assets as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540658
We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives when screening primarily improves the bank’s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083726
between two second-best alternative devices: costly monitoring and credit rationing. We show that investment depends on both … the lending rate and the information structure. Since monitoring incentives increase with interest rate margins, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662062
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541031
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802037
The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration. These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers. We show that these deregulations may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802057
This paper explores the use of the Panzar-Rosse statistic as a basis for empirical assessment of competitive conditions among Tunisian deposit banks. The elaborated model has been tested with an interest revenues equation and a total revenues equation. Proceeding by means of an Ordinary Least...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554185